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The EU-funded project UAN (Underwater Acoustic Network) was aimed at conceiving, developing, and testing
at sea an innovative and operational concept for integrating underwater and above-water sensors in a unique
communication system to protect offshore and coastline critical infrastructures. This work gives details on
the underwater part of the project. It introduces a set of original security features and gives details on the
integration of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) as mobile nodes of the network and as surveillance
assets, acoustically controlled by the command and control center to respond against intrusions. Field results
are given of the final UAN project sea trial, UAN11, held in May 2011 in Norway. During the experimental
activities, a UAN composed of four fixed nodes, two AUVs, and one mobile node mounted on the supporting
research vessel was operated continuously and integrated into a global protection system. In this article, the
communication performance of the network is reported in terms of round-trip time, packet loss, and average
delivery ratio. Themajor results of the experiment can be thus summarized: the implemented network structure
was successful in continuously operating over five dayswith nodes seamlessly entering and exiting the network;
the performance of the network varied greatly with fluctuations in the acoustic channel; the addition of security
features induced a minor degradation in network performance with respect to channel variation; the AUVs
were successfully controlled from a remote station through acoustic signals routed by the network. C© 2013 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc., A Wiley Company
1. INTRODUCTION
Increased interest in ocean natural resources has resulted in
a growing number of infrastructures located near the sea.
New generations of wave-based power plants have been
recently tested, not to mention the renewed tendency to ex-
ploit deep-water oil and gas drills to tackle the exhaustion
of ground wells. These new ocean-based installations cre-
ate new and great economic opportunities as they pose new
challenges for their protection. Their location, which is usu-
ally far from the coast, their exposure against intrusions or
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natural disasters (such as earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.), and
their high structural complexity, with many moving under-
water and floating parts, make the security issues of such
vital areas particularly delicate, requiring an integrated ap-
proach from air coverage to underwater defense. It is clear
that in such scenarios, requirements such as flexibility, rapid
reaction, resilience, fast deployment (the possibility to plug
and play new components), as well as having a high level
of automation and modularity play a key role. In this re-
gard, research on security has been concentrated thus far
on the optimization of fixed sensors to guarantee the best
static anti-intrusion configuration (Becker et al., 2008). As
a recent example, in Caiti et al. (2012b), a software simu-
lator is used to determine the deployment of underwater
sensors. The protection system can include unmanned sur-
face vessels, but the skeleton of the monitoring system is
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only composedoffixed sonars ormagnetometers.Of course,
the presence of mobile nodes or agents adds an enormous
amount of flexibility, as it would enable the system’s on-
line adaptation to the variation of the environment. This
becomes of paramount importance in the underwater do-
main, which is characterized by very variable conditions;
an anti-intrusion system optimized for a given environment
may become useless when oceanic conditions vary, e.g., the
presence of rain, temperature changes, etc. One of the first
at-sea experiments of adaptive behavior for autonomous
underwater vehicles (AUVs) is described in Hamilton et al.
(2010), with an explicit reference to antisubmarine warfare.
The AUV represented the entire surveillance system, and
no cooperation with additional sensors was included. Of
course, when several mobile and fixed nodes cooperate to
reach a common goal, the communication infrastructure be-
comes of key importance. Although the solution of having
fixed sensors that are interconnected through cables is entic-
ing, due to high-bandwidth and low-delay communication
links, when moving assets are in the system, going wire-
less remains the only option. In this case, even more prob-
lems arise with respect to the terrestrial case (Akyildiz et al.,
2005). The physics of acoustic propagation, the main means
of underwater communication, is strongly dependent on
the specific environmental conditions, and during the life
of the network each node can experience abrupt changes in
the channel, producing a consequent variation in commu-
nication performance. Acoustic communication is severely
band-limited and range-limited. A sudden reduction of the
channel capacity and bandwidth, or even a temporary loss
of connectivity, are frequent conditions for underwater com-
munications (Caiti et al., 2010; Stojanovic, 2007), influencing
the node’s ability to continue its mission.
Given the current limitations of acoustic-based devices,
a robust implementation of underwater acoustic networks
(UANs) is still an open researchfield.An interesting theoret-
ical overview of recent protocols for underwater networks
is provided in Pompili and Akyildiz (2009), where the main
advantages and disadvantages of various network designs
are pointed out. Field examples of UANs with measured
performance in the field are, however, scarce; results are
available for vehicle-to-vehicle acoustic communication or
one-to-many broadcasting (Hamilton et al., 2010; Schneider
and Schmidt, 2010b), or for partial network implementation
as in Petrioli et al. (2011). The lack of results is also due to the
complexities of at-sea experimentations. On the other hand,
it is well known that in amarine scenario, simulations are of
limited value, as it is very difficult to properly represent the
constraints and disturbances of a real underwater environ-
ment, both for communication and for autonomous vehicle
operations.
In the above context, the FP7 UANproject (UAN, 2012)
was aimed at conceiving, developing, and testing at sea an
operational concept for integrating submerged, surface, and
aerial sensors in a unique communication system with the
objective of protecting offshore and coastline critical infras-
tructures. The UAN project ended in 2011 with the UAN11
sea trial. In this paper, we focus on the underwater network
part of the project, reporting on the implemented solutions
and the performance as measured in the field. We believe
that the reporting of the field performance is of value in
itself, since it may enable the research community to orient
toward either refinements or different approaches with the
long-term objective of achieving operational implementa-
tions of underwater networks integrating AUVs. To prop-
erly assess the measured performance, it is important to
have a clear description of what has been implemented;
therefore, the paper reports in some detail the implemen-
tation choices and the rationale behind them, even if our
implementation is mostly based on known protocols and
technologies.
It is important to stress that communication is not only
the simple sharing of information. In operative scenarios,
secure communication becomes a key issue to ensure that
the correct data are transmitted and received by the right
nodes, and only among the desired group. The possibil-
ity to securely share necessary information may, in fact,
determine the success or failure of a mission. Listening
to private messages and modifying or injecting fake data
are typical threats in communication networks, and they
become even more critical in the context of a distributed
cooperation of autonomous agents/nodes for surveillance
applications. Cooperation for protection may be achieved
only when all the components receive the expected data
from legitimate peers. Underwater communication intro-
duces additional peculiarities with regard to network secu-
rity. In contrast to traditional wired networks, an adversary
equipped with an acoustic modem can easily eavesdrop
as well as modify and insert fake messages. Furthermore,
thevariability in communicationperformance togetherwith
bandwidth and range limitation make the simple adapta-
tion of traditional security solutions (e.g., digital signatures)
practically infeasible. In this regard, the approach proposed
in this work constrains all the protocols for protection of
communication at the middleware level of the acoustic net-
work. To the best of our knowledge, the only middleware
already available for UANs is Seaware (Marques et al.,
2006b). Seaware is a publish/subscribe (pub/sub) system
that has the advantage of being adaptable to both radio-
based and acoustic communications; however, this system
requires direct access to the node transmission deviceswith-
out any intermediate network layers, such as transport or
routing, hence reducing network modularity and flexibil-
ity. Furthermore, it does not include any form of network
security. In this work, we present a different and original
design and implementation of a network security system at
the middleware level, built on top of the MOOS (Mission
OrientedOperating Suite) pub/sub system (Benjamin et al.,
2009, Newman, 2012). We are not aware of any previously
published attempt to introduce security mechanisms to
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
Andrea et al.: Mobile underwater sensor networks for protection and security • 239
Figure 1. UAN network layers.
underwater networked communications, not even at a the-
oretical level.
In summary, the UAN11 network was composed of up
to four fixed nodes, two autonomous mobile nodes [AUVs
of Folaga class (Caffaz et al., 2010)], and one additional node
mounted on the supporting research vessel. Each node im-
plemented the network architecture depicted in Figure 1:
the physical layer was supported by the acoustic modems
built by Kongsberg Maritime (KM), which were capable of
transmitting up to 500 bps andwhich also implemented the
MAC protocol, the routing layer, and the multihop strate-
gies. The network architecture was completed by imple-
menting a tunneling mechanism to establish the Internet
protocol (IP) connection by using UDP as transport proto-
col, and finally by the custom-developed secure version of
MOOS as the middleware/application level. MOOS also
represented the basic infrastructure for the software on-
board the AUVs. The acoustic network was finally inte-
grated into a global protection system (Casalino et al., 2010),
which combined above-water and underwater protection
sensors (e.g. cameras, radars, sonars, etc.) into a unique
system.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of the UAN11 sea trial, describing the equipment
and algorithms used. Section 3 describes the objectives of
the sea trial and defines the figures ofmerit used to evaluate
the communication performance. Section 4 shows results
from the sea trial, and comments are made on expected
and obtained results. Section 5 sums up the lessons learned
and suggests some future improvements. Finally, Section 6
draws conclusions.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE UAN11 SEA TRIAL
The UAN11 experiment was the final experimental activity
of the project UAN (UAN, 2012). The sea trial took place be-
tween May 23 and May 29, 2011 in the Trondheim fjord, off
the coast of Norway. The area was ideally suited to acous-
tic network testing because of its varying bathymetry, with
depth varying from 40 to 150 m. Moreover, the fjord is in a
commercial area, with daily commercial and tourist routes,
so the system could be tested in operative conditions. Our
primary platform of operation was the Gunnerus Research
Vessel of the Norwegian University of Science and Technol-
ogy (NTNU). The fixednodes of the networkwere deployed
formGunnerus and left in place for three days in continuous
operation, then recovered for battery recharging and rede-
ployed for the remaining period. The AUVs were deployed
either from rubber boats or fromGunnerus. The goals of the
experiment included a great deal of testing and data col-
lection. Its main objectives, however, were to demonstrate
the acoustic network functionalities and the integration of
the underwater mobile sensors into the global protection
system.
Figure 2 shows the network setup superimposed on the
bathymetric lines of the area of the sea trial. The underwater
network was hence integrated into the air/land security
systemArchimede of theUANpartner Selex. The command
and control center was located on shore, close to the pier.
The envisaged UAN scenario consists of (see Figure 3):
 A land stationwhich acts as aCommandandControl (C2)
center, for the physical defense of a critical infrastructure;
 A terrestrial/air protection system controlled by the C2
and composed of fixed and mobile sensors;
 An underwater base station wired to the shore with a
high bandwidth link. This station represents the connec-
tion between the above and below water environments;
for this reason, this element is part of both the acoustic
network and a traditional wired communication infras-
tructure;
 Fixed and mobile nodes (n) acoustically connected in
an underwater network which includes the base station.
Each node is equipped with onboard sonar for intrusion
detection and with an acoustic modem for communica-
tion purposes.
One of the critical aspects is related to the integration
between such different systems, which include above-water
and underwater components. In the case of the UAN sys-
tem, this integration has been realized using two basic com-
ponents or network layers: the IP, which permits us to create
a standard interface toward thehigher layers of thenetwork,
and the use of a publish/subscribe system to abstract the
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Figure 2. UAN11 experimental area.Top: network geometry shown on bathymetric contours. STU is the UANbase station. FNO1,
FNO2, and FNO3 are the fixed nodes; OBJ1 is the location of a simulated threat. The gray lines connecting the nodes represent
the shortest path between two nodes and are shown only to indicate the distance (i.e., they are not representative of the network
topology). PIER represents the location of the UAN command and control center placed on shore. Bottom: aerial overview of the
UAN area. The path of the cable, which links the underwater network to the terrestrial part, is highlighted.
specific characteristics of the components. In the remainder
of the paper, we focus on the middleware and application
level of the UAN concept, and we assume the presence of a
reliable network able to support the physical communica-
tion. More details on the UAN lower-level hardware can be
found in Husoy et al. (2011).
The following sections describe the experimental
equipment, the node control, and communication algo-
rithms used during the sea trial.
2.1. Equipment
2.1.1. The eFolaga AUV
The mobile node of the acoustic network was the eFolaga
AUV, which was modified to accommodate the KM acous-
tic modem. The eFolaga is a torpedo-like vehicle consist-
ing of two fiberglass water-proof cylinders, which compose
the main hull, and one or more additional modules that
can be mounted at midvehicle to host a mission-driven
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
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Figure 3. Conceptual overview of the UAN scenario: integration of above-water and underwater systems.
payload. The two main cylinders are connected to two wet
ends where jet-pumps are located for steering, and the pro-
peller for the surge direction. More specifically, yaw, sway,
and heave thrusters are distributed both fore and aft; fur-
thermore, the forward section contains a ballast for buoy-
ancy control. The eFolaga truster distribution guarantees a
great amount of maneuverability and permits vehicle mo-
tion in all directions. As an example, the vehicle is capable
of moving vertically in the water column at a desired pitch
angle; this is a desirable property for a mobile node of a net-
work that may need to adapt its position to follow the best
acoustic channel. The addition of a new module requires
mechanically splitting the vehicle to graft in the additional
part. The main vehicle computer is located in the aft sec-
tion, and the availability and the control of the components
in the fore part must be communicated to the main com-
puter through the module stack (electrical connections be-
tween sections are made through flying leads). Eight power
conductors have to be carried through to enable the bow
and stern sections to operate. Of these, the module may tap
into four: a common high-current AnalogueGroundReturn
Line, a+12 VDC Power Supply Line, and a+12VDC Power
Demand Line together with a low-current Digital Ground
Return Line. The Demand Line supplies power to start up
or shut down the module stack under control of the ve-
hicle’s computer. Modules may draw up to 100 mA from
the Power Supply Line to power communication hubs, en-
able sleep modes, etc. Maximum peak current drawn by a
module from the Power Demand Line during a mission is 8
Amps, with amaximum total power consumption from this
line of 100 Whrs during a mission. In addition to the power
lines, themodule stack is also required to carry throughUSB
and Ethernet (100 Mbps) connectivity from the aft section
for any module that may need it.
When at the surface, the vehicle has continuous GPS
(global positioning system) contact and land-station con-
tact through a multiradio link. The land-station link allows
Table I. eFolaga AUV, main technical characteristics.
Item Description
Diameter (m)
External 0.155
Length (m) 2.222
Mass (kg) 32.0
Mass variation range (kg)
(assuming water density
1027 kg/m3)
0.5
Range of moving mass
displacement (m)
0.050
Energy storage NiMh batteries, 12 V, 45 Ah
Autonomy (hrs) 8 at full speed
Diving scope (m) 0–80
Break point in depth (m) 100
Speed
knots 2 (jet pumps)/4 (propeller)
m/s 1.01/2.02
Communication multiradio link (when on
surface)
for on-line modification of the mission requirements and
for almost real-time data transmission. A summary of the
main technical characteristics of the eFolaga is reported in
Table I.
To integrate the eFolagas within the UAN network,
a specific payload with dedicated hardware (Table II) has
been realized to connect the acoustic modem to the vehi-
cle electronics. The main hardware of the payload is repre-
sented by a PC-104 board with serial lines to communicate
with the modem and the CTD probe, which is available for
continuous monitoring of the water conditions. The Ether-
net line is used for communication between the board and
the eFolaga native computer. Figure 4 shows the Folaga
AUVs with the UAN module mounted at midvehicle (and
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Table II. Payload hardware: main board characteristics.
Item Description
CPU 1GHz, VIA EDEN, Ultra Low Voltage
DRAM 1GB, DDR2, 533/400 on SO-DIMM
socket
Chipset VIA CX700M
Serial ports 1 RS232 Full modem
1 RS232FM/422/485 Configurable
USB ports 2 × USB 2.0
Hard disk 4 GB Internal Flash Disk
Figure 4. Folagas on shore; the UAN module is visible,
mounted at midvehicle.
in one case, a CT probe). Figure 5 shows the AUV deploy-
ment from Gunnerus during one of the trials.
2.2. Network base station and fixed nodes
The remaining nodes of the network were composed of a
Subsurface Telemetry Unit (STU) and by underwater Fixed
Nodes (FNOs). The STU represented the UAN base station
and was cable-connected to shore with a high-bandwidth
no delay link to integrate the acoustic part into the wide
area network. On the acoustic side, it was equipped with a
KMmodem, with a vertical hydrophone array for unidirec-
tional high-bandwidth communication, andwith a thermis-
tor chain to measure the vertical temperature distribution.
The STU is depicted in Figure 6 during a communication
test on the Gunnerus deck before deployment at UAN11.
Three FNOswere used during the sea trial, with one of them
(FNO3) only implementing the lowest layers of the network
(physical, MAC, routing). Each FNOwas equipped with an
acoustic modem and with a vertical chain of thermistors
similar to the one installed on the STU. The deployment of
one of the FNOs during the sea trial is shown in Figure 7.
Further information on the STU can be found in Zabel et al.
(2011), while the FNOs will be treated in more detail in a
separate paper.
Figure 5. Folaga AUVs deployed from Gunnerus during the
UAN11 experimental activities.
Figure 6. STU during a communication test on the Gunnurus
deck before deployment. The two yellow cylinders are the KM
modems, of which one is the STU’s and the other is for testing.
The gray box contains the STU electronics. Also visible in the
photo is the blue cable used to connect the STU to shore, the
black thermistor chain, and the hydrophone array.
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Figure 7. Deployment of a FNO from Gunnerus.
2.3. Algorithms and software implementation
2.3.1. eFolaga mission supervisor
From an architectural perspective, the goal is that of imple-
menting a mission supervisor capable of interpreting and
generating messages to the other network nodes, and to
give commands to the vehicle native Guidance, Navigation,
and Control (GNC) system. The approach followed is the
back-seat driver paradigm, pioneered by the MIT group and
co-workers (Balasuriya et al., 2009; Benjamin et al., 2010;
Eickstedt and Sideleau, 2008): the mission supervisor must
be able to make decisions and give high-level commands
to the native GNC vehicle system, which is solely responsi-
ble for the low-level execution of the commands. Similarly,
the supervisor must handle the communication tasks at the
application level, while the lower-level communication is
left to the software implemented in the acoustic modem it-
self. In this way, as conceptually depicted in Figure 8, it is
possible to integrate in a modular way all the system com-
ponents regardless of the specific nature of the vehicle, the
acoustic modem, and the MAC and routing strategy of the
communication network. The Folaga mission supervisor is
Figure 8. Conceptual architectural scheme of the imple-
mented system.
divided into different modules, called virtual bots, each of
which is assigned to a specific task, and which is indepen-
dent from the others as long as it shares a common interface
to exchange data. Each virtual bot has its own input, which
is dependent on the task it has to perform (e.g., the commu-
nication bot receives inputs from the acoustic modem) and
produces an output toward a central or decision bot, which
can be thought of as the commander of the vehicle. The cen-
tral bot decides the next step of the mission depending on
the user requirements and on the basis of the output pro-
duced by the othermodules. The decision bot of themission
supervisor is implemented as an event-driven Mealy finite
state machine, which generates an output based on its cur-
rent state and input. Each one of the states of the machine
is related to a desired mission task to be executed by the
Folaga vehicle (e.g., the Navigation task), or a task to be ex-
ecuted by a specific module of the system (e.g., the MOOS
pub/sub system to send a specific acoustic message), or a
waiting condition. One of the most critical parts in the de-
scribed architecture is represented by the interface between
the mission supervisor on the payload computer and the
eFolaga existing software. Two specific modules of the mis-
sion supervisor, Folaga Controller and Radio Controller, are
dedicated to this task, and each one has a counterpart on
the vehicle. Figure 9 shows the block diagram of the main
processes running on the AUV. In particular:
 The Folaga Controller connects to a dedicated process
(Payload Control Server) on the eFolaga. It is responsible
for the communication between the Folaga Control Sys-
tem and the mission supervisor (e.g., communication of
mission commands, errors, etc.).
 The Radio Controller represents the radio operator of the
payload, as it connects to the RadioModemClient on the
eFolaga. It is responsible for receiving user commands
when the eFolaga is on the surface and for transmitting
Journal of Field Robotics DOI 10.1002/rob
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Figure 9. Interface between the eFolaga GNC and the UAN
payload.
logs and requests from themission supervisor. The avail-
ability of the radio for the mission supervisor permits a
real-time monitoring of the mission.
Communication at the mission supervisor level is han-
dled through the MOOS system, as described in the next
section.
Finally, a dedicated cooperation module is responsible for
the management of the cooperation with the other vehicles
and fixed nodes of the network. Each agent, on the basis
of the information received acoustically from its teammates
(e.g., location), and on the basis of the environmental mea-
surements periodically performed or transmitted by other
nodes, is able to autonomously adapt its position to the
specific communication anddetectionperformance encoun-
tered as its mission proceeds. The cooperative algorithm is
based on distributed decisions, and each vehicle mustmake
individual choices to achieve the final goal, handling situ-
ations in which it is completely disconnected from the net-
work. From the standpoint of the mission supervisor, the
presence of a cooperative module does not pose additional
complexity as its output is utilizedby thedecisionmodule in
composition with the user requests and the output coming
from the other modules. Specifically, the decision bot uses
the commands coming from the cooperative module if no
other commands from the C2 are scheduled to be executed.
We do not go further with the description of the coopera-
tive algorithm as it would go beyond the scope of this work;
however, more information on its theoretical aspects can be
found in Caiti et al. (2012a) for the area coverage problem,
and in Munafo` et al. (2011) for cooperative explorations of
marine areas.
2.3.2. IS-MOOS: autonomous node integration into UAN
Real-world integration and distributed application devel-
opment for underwater acoustic networks is quite a dif-
ficult task. However, an appropriate middleware may
make application development easier by providing com-
mon programming abstractions, by masking the hetero-
geneity and the distribution of the underlying hardware
and operating systems, and by hiding low-level program-
ming details (Bernstein, 1993). In underwater acoustic net-
works, the MOOS middleware has gained great popu-
larity (Benjamin et al., 2009; 2010). In short, MOOS is a
publish/subscribe system for intravehicle interprocess com-
munication (IPC), which supports dynamic, asynchronous,
many-to-many distributed communication (Oxford Mobile
Robotics Group, 2012). In MOOS, a dispatcher is responsible
for routingmessages from publishers to subscribers.Messages
are routed according to their topics, which are message de-
scriptors contained in themessages themselves. Subscribers
declare their interests in specific topics by issuing subscrip-
tions to the dispatcher, while publishers send the dispatcher
messages belonging to the various topics. In MOOS par-
lance, the dispatcher is called MOOSDB.
The publish/subscribe paradigm is particularly suit-
able for distributed cooperative applications (Marques et al.,
2006a; 2006b; Schneider and Schmidt, 2010a). Therefore, a
natural choice would be to adopt MOOS for intervehicle
interprocess communication too. In so doing, an applica-
tion developer would experience a single communication
abstraction and interface for interprocess communication.
Unfortunately,MOOSpresents severe limitationswhen em-
ployed for interprocess communication in an acoustic net-
work. First of all, the communication between a client and
theMOOSDB isusually basedona transmission control pro-
tocol (TCP), an end-to-end protocol that requires an always-
up connection. Whenever a client loses its connection to the
MOOSDB, the system tries to reestablish it. Whereas this
approach is effective for traditional radio-based networks,
in the case of underwater networks it creates undesired traf-
fic and network overload. The underwater communication
between any two nodes depends strongly on oceanic con-
ditions, which in general vary continuously, making it im-
possible to guarantee a reliable end-to-end communication
(Akyildiz et al., 2005).
Furthermore, since each client tries to reconnect to the
MOOSDB as soon as it loses its connection [e.g., for a de-
crease in the channel capacity or bandwidth (Caiti et al.,
2010)], this creates an additional communication overhead
just in those moments when the acoustic channel is likely to
be very poor, thus causing, as a consequence, network con-
gestions and message loss. The second problem is that each
client that wants to connect to the database must perform a
preliminary handshake to register and enter into the system,
specifying its topics of interest. Since this process is particu-
larly delicate, MOOS ensures its robustness and coherence,
reinitializing it whenever a problem is encountered. Again,
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while the approach may be successfully utilized for high-
bandwidth and no-delay communications, it makes the
entire client registration process unfeasible in the presence
of frequent disconnections andmessage loss. Finally, as was
thought for intravehicle interprocess communication, the
MOOS systemdoes not provide anynetwork securitymech-
anism. In the case of open communication channels, as in
the underwater one, this means that a spoofing attack (i.e.,
impersonation of a node) or a snooping attack (i.e., unau-
thorized eavesdropping of messages) may compromise the
entire system’s integrity and confidentiality.
To copewith these limitations, within the UANproject,
the basic MOOS system was extended in two ways: first of
all, it was modified to improve efficiency and robustness of
intervehicle interprocess communication; second, network
security solutions were integrated into the MOOS interve-
hicle communication protocol. The resulting middleware is
called the Intervehicle Secure MOOS (IS-MOOS).
The IS-MOOS middleware represents a key point in
the UAN proposed architecture. Actually, the resulting uni-
fied publish-subscribe communication framework allows
for the integration of all the heterogeneous autonomousmo-
bile and fixed nodes into the application level of the UAN.
With reference to the Folaga control architecture (Figure 9),
the communication module of the mission supervisor is, in
fact, realized as an IS-MOOS client. Through IS-MOOS, the
client can thus convert themessages coming from other net-
worknodes (e.g., theCommandandControl Center) into in-
formation for the decision module of the vehicle, and hence
into vehicle commands.Conversely it can translate informa-
tion on the vehicle’s status into messages to be transmitted
acoustically to other interested readers (e.g., other network
nodes for cooperative mission planning). In this sense, the
IS-MOOS system realizes the concept of a network, which,
being composed of autonomous nodes, adapts its behavior
(i.e., topology) to tackle changes in the surrounding envi-
ronment (e.g., change in the communication performance).
In the next two sections, we will provide some insights
regarding IS-MOOS solutions for communication efficiency
and security. The source code of IS-MOOS and the related
user manual can be downloaded from the project web site
(UAN, 2012).
IS-MOOS solution for efficiency
Figure 10 shows the general architecture of IS-MOOS. Ren-
dering the MOOS system able to support the communica-
tion between different nodes of the underwater network
means that the MOOSDB becomes an external server lo-
cated in one of the network nodes, while the communica-
tion with the clients exploits the underwater channel. The
use of acoustics implies that each node of the network must
be extremely robust and able to autonomously adapt to the
unexpected changes of the channel, avoiding, as much as
possible, sending unnecessary messages. In UAN, this has
Figure 10. The IS-MOOS software architecture: client-side
(left); server-side (right).
been achieved in two ways: using the User Datagram Pro-
tocol (UDP) as the transport protocol of the network, and
modifying the MOOSDB and client’s structure to enhance
the communication.UDPpresents several advantageswhen
used for the underwater channel. In particular, it does not
require an end-to-end connection, thereby entirely avoid-
ing management issues (e.g., handshake at the connection
level) typical of connection-oriented protocols, such as TCP.
Its main drawback is that, of course, it does not provide
the same level of reliability in message delivery: additional
services, such as packet retransmission and delivery war-
ranties, must therefore be transposed either to the lower
layers of the network (e.g., MAC) or directly to the applica-
tion level.
Furthermore, the MOOSDB structure has been modi-
fied to increase its robustness and capability to deal with
delays, communication uncertainty, and the unreliabilities
of the acoustic channel. Specifically, it has been given a
multithreaded architecture to completely isolate each client
from the others. In practice, each client C is associated with
a thread TC on the database of which the client must know
the address and the port in advance. In this way, while a
unique link between each client and the database (sandbox)
is created, the need for initial handshaking to establish the
communication parameters is also avoided: if the client C
wants to send a message mC , it simply starts its transmis-
sion toward its related address andport,while thededicated
thread TC will be waiting for it. When the thread TC has a
message mT for C, it sends C the message mT together with
the information for clock synchronization. However, since
there is no preliminary handshake, the described communi-
cation techniquemakes the system very fragile with respect
to authentication issues. Itmay easily happen that a clientC ′
begins to send messages to the thread TC simply using the
C’s address and port. To avoid this problem, all messages
have to be authenticated as described in the next section,
and upon receiving a message, the thread TC verifies the
authenticity of its source. How IS-MOOS addresses these
security issues will be discussed in next section.
The IS-MOOS security suite
Confidentiality of messages (i.e., communication between
two nodes is “privileged” and may not be discussed or
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divulged to third parties) is achieved through encryption.
In UAN, the specific encryption technique used is the sym-
metric one. Encryption is realized by splitting cleartext in
blocks of fixed, predefined bit-length and encrypting each
single block. In the most general case, cleartext length is not
a multiple of the block length, thus padding is necessary.
However, padding has the negative effect that the cipher-
text may turn out to be up to one block longer than the cor-
responding cleartext. This effect is called ciphertext expan-
sion. While the ciphertext expansion overhead is negligible
in a traditional network, it becomes relevant in wireless
sensor networks and, in particular, in underwater acoustic
networkswhere themessage size is typically quite small (be-
cause of energy and communication constraints). To avoid
such a problem, the IS-MOOS security suite has been based
on the CipherText Stealing (CTS) technique. According to
this approach, we alter the processing of the last two blocks
of plaintext, resulting in a reordered transmission of the last
two blocks of ciphertext without the need for any cipher-
text expansion (Schneier, 1995). The sole encryptionwithout
authentication is insecure (Menezes et al., 1996). For exam-
ple, an adversarymayflip bits in unauthenticated ciphertext
and cause predictable changes in the plaintext that receivers
are not able to detect. To address this vulnerability, the IS-
MOOS system always authenticates messages. Security of
hash functions is directly related to the length of the di-
gest. However, as a digest is appended to the message, it
becomes another source of message expansion and conse-
quent communication overhead. UAN features a trade-off
between security and performance by using 4-byte digests
resulting from truncating the real hash function value. Us-
ing such a short hash function value is not detrimental
to security (Dini and Lo Duca, 2011). An adversary has a
1 in 232 chance to blindly forge a digest. If an adversary re-
peatedly tries to forge it, he/she needs on average 231 trials,
which, however, cannot be performed offline. This means
that the adversary has to validate a given forgery only by
sending it to an authorized receiver. This implies that the
adversary has to send 231 messages in order to successfully
forge a single malicious message. While in a conventional
network this number of trials is not large enough, it is clear
that in an underwater acoustic network this should provide
an adequate level of security. An adversary can try to flood
the network with forgeries, but on a 500-bps channel with
184-bit messages, he/she can only send about 2.71 attempts
per second. Thus, sending 231 messages requires around
306 months, i.e., about 25 years. Battery-operated vehicles
do not have enough energy to receive that many messages.
Furthermore, the integrity attack would translate into a de-
nial of service attack since the adversary needs to occupy the
acoustic channel for a long time, and it is feasible to detect
when such an attack is underway. Simple heuristics have
been used in UAN: vehicles signal the base station (com-
mand and control) when the rate of digest/MAC failures
exceeds a predetermined threshold.
Table III. Position of network fixed nodes.
Node lat, lon (decimal deg) depth (m)
STU 63,44171873; 10,71354497 90.3
FNO1 63,44285603; 10,71539267 96
FNO2 63,44698453; 10,72613567 39
FNO3 63,44524920; 10,71338701 98
Table IV. KM modem technical characteristics.
info settings
Model Km cNode mini transponder
frequency (kHz) 25.6
Source Level (dB re 1 μPa@1m) 173–190
Rate (bps) 200–500
2.4. Mission setup for UAN11
This section describes specific settings for the network and
for the algorithms used during the UAN11 activities. On
May 23, 2011 the STU nodewas deployed. The networkwas
used with a temporary topology composed of the STU and
two fixed nodes, both located close to the pier. On May 24,
two FNOs were deployed at their final location, as shown
in Table III. FNO3 was finally deployed on May 26 to sub-
stitute FNO1, which was lost at sea (a rope broke during
its recovery for recharging). Each node was equipped with
the same acoustic modem, provided by the UAN partner
KongsbergMaritime. This modem represented the physical
layer of the UAN. Table IV shows the main modem settings
as used during the tests. The modem DSP board also im-
plemented the link and network layers to execute medium
access control (MAC) and data packet switching and for-
warding. In particular, the medium access was realized
through a Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision avoid-
ance (CSMA/CA) mechanism, while the routing protocol
was based on the FLOOD algorithm (Rudstad, 2009). Fi-
nally, the network stackwas completed, as described in Sec-
tion 2.3.2, using IP/UDP as internetworking and transport
protocols, and IS-MOOS as a middleware and application
level, which included network security mechanisms (see
Figure 1). The underwater network was integrated as part
of the global protection system as described in Section 2. Ac-
cording to theMOOS paradigm, all the network nodeswere
connected to the central database (IS-MOOSDB), whichwas
physically located onshore, and logically on the UAN base
station (STU). The network traffic was mainly composed
of environmental data, transmitted periodically (once ev-
ery Ts = 120 s) from both the fixed and mobile nodes. In
addition, further information could be requested by the C2
when needed (e.g., node battery status, etc.). The average
message size at the application level was 150 bytes. Note
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that the transmission parameter Ts was set up empirically:
decreasing or increasing such a parameter would dimin-
ish the network throughput due to network congestions or
because not all the available bandwidth was used.
3. SEA TRIAL OBJECTIVES AND COMMUNICATION
METRICS
As for the network operability, the sea trial objectives can
be summarized as follows:
 Network robustness: how well the network is able to
cope with changes in topology, nodes entering/exiting,
channel variability.
 Communication performance: in absolute terms and the
relative variationswith respect to environmental changes
(e.g., due to varying oceanographic conditions) and due
to the overhead implied by the application of the security
features.
 Proof of concept of feasibility in using the network also
as an integrated part of a wider asset security system,
allowing detection and reaction to underwater intrusion
events, and effectiveness in commanding AUV missions
through the network by the remote C2 station.
The network communication performance has been
evaluated at the application level using three different
metrics:
 Round-Trip Time (RTT), computed as the time in seconds
for a message to go back and forth from a client to the
database. This time encomposses the propagation time
of the message in the water and the time required to get
through all the network layers, both at the client and at
the database.
 Packet Loss (PL), computed as the number of pack-
ets sent by a client and received by the database, and
viceversa. Note that the PL could differ from the packet
loss at the physical level, as each acoustic packet can be
transmitted up to three times by the modems, if a recep-
tion acknowledgment is not received.
 Average Delivery Ratio (ADR), defined as the average
ratio between the number of receivedmessages by a node
and the number of sent messages to that node.
Oceanographic environmental conditions were mon-
itored by measuring temperature and salinity as a func-
tion of depth and time, and deriving the associated sound
speed profile using the well-known Chen-Millero equation
(Millero, 2010). These measurements were taken by deploy-
ing Conductivity-Temperature-Depth (CTD) probes from
the Gunnerus R/V at different times of the day, typically
three to four casts per day.
4. RESULTS
The UAN network was continuously operated during the
five days of the UAN11 sea trial, from May 23 to May 27,
2011. During this period, the entire network stack was fully
tested. Nodes were routinely added and/or removed: eFo-
laga AUVs were deployed within the existing fixed net-
work, and both fixed and mobile nodes were recovered for
battery recharging and then redeployed. Overall, the under-
water network showed a quite impressive level of robust-
ness in terms of capability to tackle variations in the oceanic
conditions and modification in its topology.
The channel conditions were very unstable, and the
communication performance quite variable. Usually a 500
bps data rate was used with success in the early hours of
each day, but 200 bps was often necessary, especially in the
afternoon. Partial explanation may be found in the fresh
water coming from rivers and rain, and in the persistent
presence of wind. Figures 11 and 12 show Sound Speed
Profiles (SSP) and salinity profiles, during three days of
experiment, between May 25 and May 27, 2011, taken at
various hours of the day. The presence of more fresh water
in the upper layers is visible.
The first two days of the experiment were, for the most
part, devoted to the network setup and to testing the lowest
levels of the UAN, from the physical transmission up to the
MAC and routing layers. Multihop was successfully tested
with the mobile nodes acting as relays, usually between the
STU and the furthest node, FNO2. Between May 23 and
May 24, 2011 IS-MOOS was used during limited periods
of time, mainly to test its integration with the lower-level
components.
BetweenMay 25 andMay 26, 2011 the IS-MOOS system
was used continuously, as shown in Figure 13 in terms of
Packet Reception Ratio (PRR) at themiddleware level. From
the figure, which represents the messages transmitted back
and forth from the FNO2 to theMOOSDB, a variation in the
communication performance is clearly visible. Such behav-
ior was related both to the changes in the acoustic channel
and to the periods of network overloadwithmessage drops
due to too many messages transmitted with respect to
the available bandwidth. It must be pointed out that such
effects are, however, correlated, and at the current state it
is difficult to separate the two contributions. A decrease in
the acoustic channel may easily cause network congestion,
which lasts as long as the network itself is not able to adapt
to the new conditions (e.g., acoustic modem SL increase,
decrease of the transmission bit rate, and modification in
the network topology to improve the communication).
Network security was activated on May 26, 2011, at 3.14
pm and left on from that moment. On May 26, FNO2 was
left in nonsecure modality in order to verify the overall
behavior of the security mechanisms implemented. For this
reason, all the packets received by the DB and coming from
FNO2 were considered as coming from an intruder and
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Figure 11. Sound speed profiles measured between May 25 and May 27, 2011.
Figure 12. Salinity profiles measured between May 25 and May 27, 2011.
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Figure 13. Packet reception ratio recorded on May 25–26, 2011 along the link FNO2 - MOOSDB. One can clearly see the variation
in the communication performance during the operation days. Network security was kept off for most of the period and activated
on May 26, 2011 at 15.14 pm. From that moment on, FNO2 was maintained out of the network by the DB as the node was not
switched to the secure communication mode, and hence was considered to be an intruder. It reentered into the UAN on May 27,
2011 when it was switched to the secure IS-MOOS (see Figure 14).
consequently dropped (and not shown in the figure). On
May 27, all the nodes (including FNO2) were in secure com-
munication, and the PRR in the link between FNO2 and the
MOOSDB is shown in Figure 14. The first part of the day
was devoted to low-level communication tests, hence no
packets were received at the middleware level. Figure 15
shows a comparison between the network ADR for two
different nodes, without security features and with cryp-
tography, integrity, and authentication services enabled. It
is clear from the picture that when the security was acti-
vated, the network was subjected to an ADR decrease of
8%. This decrease was due to two concurrent effects:
 The message expansion caused by the authenticator,
which in turn increases the probability of packet loss.
 A decrease in acoustic communication conditions.
Since these two effects are strictly interconnected, it is
not possible to separate the specific weight of each of the
two components in the mix. However, the ADR decrease
is sustainable and the effect of the use of network security
appears not to be critical with respect to the decrease in
performance due to the degradation of the communication
channel.
A global overview of the middleware performance is
given in Tables V and VI in terms of average packet loss
for each node of the network, and in terms of average RTT.
Figure 14. Packet reception ratio recorded on May 27, 2011
along the link FNO2 - MOOSDB. Network security services
were activated. Variations in communication performance are
clearly visible.
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Figure 15. Average delivery ratio (ADR) performance. When
the security was activated there was a decrease of 8% in the
ADR. The decrease was due to two concurrent conditions: a
decrease in the acoustic channel and in the message expansion
due to the authenticator. Even though, at the current stage,
we are not able to separate the two contributions, the ADR
decrease is sustainable and the effect of the use of network
security appears not to be critical.
Table V. Packet loss per day per each node in the water at
middleware level. Note that the STU was always operative.
Statistics collected on May 23 and May 24, 2011 are not very
accurate as the IS-MOOS system was activated only for a few
hours of operation.
Date Node Average Paket Loss (%)
23 May 2011 FNO1 0
FNO2 29.37
24 May 2011 FNO1 11.11
25 May 2011 FNO2 58.75
26 May 2011 R/V 32.76
FNO2 54.76
27 May 2011 Folaga1 18.31 (until 2.00 pm)
Folaga2 49.64 (after 3.00 pm)
R/V 40.58
FNO2 68.38
Except for the STU, which was always operative, not all of
the nodes were in the water at the same time, and the net-
work often had to change topology to adapt to the varying
oceanic conditions, and to route the messages via the best
communication path. On May 23, the network was com-
Table VI. Round-trip time per day per each node in the water
at middleware level. Note that the STU was always operative.
Statistics on May 23 and May 24, 2011 might be less accurate
as the IS-MOOS system was activated only for a few hours of
operation. Note that, due to the loss of the node, RTT statistics
for FNO1 on May 23 and 24 are currently not available, even
though the node was operative.
Date Node Average RTT (s)
23 May 2011 FNO2 17.39
25 May 2011 FNO2 58.71
26 May 2011 R/V 248.91
FNO2 54.39
27 May 2011 Folaga1 38.81 (up to 2.00 pm)
Folaga2 112.95 (after 3.00 pm)
R/V 35.28
FNO2 107.42
posed of the STUwith direct hops to the fixed nodes, which
were located close the pier in very shallow water. On May
23 and 24, the IS-MOOS system was up for less than 4 h the
first day, and only for 1 h the second day. Only a few mes-
sageswere exchanged, and thus the corresponding statistics
might be less accurate. Also note that, due to the loss of the
node, RTT statistics for FNO1 on May 23 and 24 are cur-
rently not available, even though the node was operative.
OnMay 25, one Folaga was used in the morning as a bridge
to reach FNO2 from the STU, while in the afternoon FNO2
was routed directly, with a single hop. On May 26, FNO1
was substituted by FNO3, which was used to relay FNO2.
Finally, on May 27, 2011, the protection system was
tested completely, including above-water and underwater
sensors. The two mobile nodes were used as active surveil-
lance assets, and kept mostly on surface, but with only
acoustic communication available for messaging with C2.
Figures 16 and 17 show the vehicle trajectories in the morn-
ing and in the afternoon, respectively. In particular, in the
afternoon of May 27, a complete anti-intrusion demonstra-
tion was carried out. With reference to Figure 17, the AUV
wasput in thewater at about 4.10pm,when it receivedafirst
mission to reachWP 1.At 4.30pm, an intrusionwasdetected
by FNO2 at location OBJ1 = (63, 44891470; 10, 71229367),
and communicated via UAN to the C2. As a response, the
C2 sent the AUV to location OBJ1 for further investiga-
tion. When the vehicle reached the point, it found itself
out of the network, without acoustic connectivity with the
remaining nodes. For this reason, the mission supervisor
onboard the vehicle autonomously planned a new mission
(red line pointing toward the STU in Figure 17) to move the
vehicle closer to the STU, where it was able to reestablish
the connection. With the vehicle again in the network, the
command and control was able to take over its control to
request a new mission (manually aborted on the spot to
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Figure 16. Folaga AUVs path during the experimental activity on May 27. In the first part of the day, the vehicle in the water
was acoustically controlled by the UAN command and control center to perform several missions (each line represents a different
mission).
proceed with other communication tests and hence not
shown in the picture).
5. LESSONS LEARNED AND OPEN RESEARCH
ISSUES
On thebasis of theUAN11 results and considering the stated
sea trial objectives, several lessons can be drawn. First of all,
the implemented solution showed robustness in preserv-
ing network connectivity and functionality at a basic level.
The network operated continuously for five days, without
any major malfunctioning, and was able to seamlessly cope
with variations in the number of nodes, changes in topol-
ogy, and communication channel variations. Communica-
tion performance, however, varied greatly depending on
oceanographic conditions, and in general has to be con-
sidered quite limited. Packet loss at the application level
was significant. This fact, coupled with the large round-trip
time (order of tens of seconds), makes it clear that, at least
with the implemented structure and in the experimental
conditions, the network cannot be used to exchange very
frequent messages among the nodes. In this respect, it can
be fairly said that the decrease in performance due to the
presence of security features (Figure 15) is of second-order
effect with respect to performance variations due to envi-
ronmental changes. Given the variability and the limitation
of the communication, the autonomy of the nodes becomes
even more important. Each node must be able to make au-
tonomous decisions to perform its taskswithout continuous
supervision by the command and control, and often even
disconnected from the rest of the network for quite long
periods of time. Furthermore, delays and packet loss are
so high that cooperation algorithms requiring a great deal
of message exchange, such as consensus-based methods,
become operatively infeasible.
Since the achievable communication performance is so
limited, it becomes important to reduce as much as possi-
ble the network communication overhead (e.g., signaling
traffic, etc.) so as to leave the bandwidth available for the
applications. In this sense, the ideas described in this pa-
per in the case of the IS-MOOS to reduce the traffic at the
middleware level could be pushed further. The use of a
centralized pub/sub system has the advantage of concen-
trating all the information exchanged within the network
into a single node. While this is useful in the case of the
protection of critical infrastructures, where the C2 requires
complete control of the system, it creates an additional com-
munication burden andmay limit the network scalability. It
is hence foreseeable that in other applications more suited
middleware may be utilized. For example, the deployment
of distributed pub/subs in terrestrial networks is currently,
being researched. This would also have the advantage of
reducing the number of messages exchanged. Similar ap-
proaches can also be extended to other network layers.
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the proof of
concept of underwater network integration in a wider se-
curity system has been achieved, as demonstrated by the
May 27 operations. Such a successful integration was fa-
vored by the use of a unified programming model, namely
publish/subscribe, and a unifiedmiddleware layer, namely
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Figure 17. In the afternoon ofMay 27, 2011, the vehicle was used as a surveillance asset. TheC2 sent the AUV in an area of possible
intrusion (OBJ1) to proceed to further investigation. Once on location, the AUV found itself out of the network. According to the
behavior described in Section 2.3, the mission supervisor autonomously planned a new mission to move toward the high value
asset (the UAN base station), where it could reenter the network.
IS-MOOS, both for intra- and intervehicle communication,
which simplified the development of secure and reliable
applications.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This work described the implementation and test at sea
of an underwater acoustic network composed of fixed and
mobile nodes, includingmultihop capabilities. The network
showed a level of robustness beyond expectations as it was
able to tackle variations in its structure,withnodes routinely
added and removed, e.g., for battery recharging, and to
adapt to the modifications of the oceanic environment. To
the best of our knowledge, this was the first time that such
a complex UAN was deployed and successfully operated.
The paper has reported details on the performance of
the acoustic communication, evaluated in terms of round-
trip time, packet loss, and average delivery ratio. The data
gathered during the experimental activities showed that the
communication performance was poor, with large and vari-
able delays and packet loss depending on day and network
configuration.
The mobile nodes of the UAN were implemented on
eFolaga AUVs, and they were used in the following ways:
as communication nodes and movable relays to reach fixed
nodes with poor acoustic connectivity; to autonomously
adapt in response to variations of the network performance;
and as surveillance assets of the UANwide-area protection
system, acoustically controlled by the C2.
The UAN network was also equipped with network
security features (IS-MOOS) to guarantee the confidential-
ity, authenticity, and integrity of the exchanged messages.
This is of paramount importance in the context of under-
water harbor protection, where the communication chan-
nel is open and often easily accessible. The UAN11 sea
trial demonstrated that, as long as the security features are
tailored to the limitations of the communication medium,
the inclusion of network security is indeed feasible even
with the bandwidth and capacity constraints that character-
ize the underwater environment. The recorded data show
that the security overhead does notworsen the performance
of the network verymuch, especially when compared to the
communication degradation due to the acoustic channel
itself.
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